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| Vol. 4, Issue 5 May 2012 |
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Letters From |
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Pakistan |
The Spy Who Left Me
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| The release of a CIA contractor accused of murder brings an unexpected end to one of Pakistan’s most riveting recent dramas |
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MOHAMMAD SAJJAD / AP PHOTO |
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| Supporters of the Pakistani religious party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, chant slogans during a rally against Raymond Allen Davis, a CIA
contractor arrested in the shooting deaths of two men.
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| W |
ITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION of
the wicketkeeper Kamran Akmal,
whose dropped catches in the
Cricket World Cup 2011 infuriated
millions of his countrymen,
no single man has galvanised the
fury of Pakistanis quite like the CIA contractor Raymond
Allen Davis. |
The twists and turns in the saga of Davis, without a doubt
the most infamous foreign visitor in Pakistan’s recent history,
have kept the country glued to TV sets and newspapers
since he was arrested on 27 January after shooting two men,
Faizan Haider and Mohammad Faheem, allegedly in self-defence,
on a Lahore street. After a protracted diplomatic
struggle that tested the fragile US-Pakistan alliance, the
curtain finally fell on 16 March, after the families of Davis’
victims agreed to accept a staggering $2.34 million in “blood
money”, leading to Davis’ release. It was Shariah law, in the
end, that saved the day.
“Let the mullahs try to criticise this now,” my communist
uncle exclaimed with a laugh as he watched right-wing TV
commentators and analysts attempting to explain that the
blood money deal was yet another conspiracy foisted upon
Pakistan.
But while some of the liberals were laughing, the right
wing was bristling with anger. When I called the president
of the religious political party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, Munawar
Hasan, an hour after the Davis deal was revealed, I
could hear him screaming in the background, presumably to a room full of deputies: “Find the families or their lawyers.
We’ll do a press conference now.”
Out in the streets, many were mourning what they said
was a loss of Pakistan’s honour. As the well-heeled socialites
of Karachi stocked up on groceries in anticipation of violent
protests, the former Inter-Services Intelligence chief
Hamid Gul hyperbolically compared Davis’ release to the
fall of Dacca (now Dhaka) in 1971.
For a country where the rule of law is next to nonexistent,
Pakistan’s police displayed remarkable efficiency in the Davis
affair. After a dramatic chase through the streets of Lahore,
the police arrested Davis before he could return to the
consulate (but not before a car sent to pick up Davis killed
a motorcyclist while rushing to the scene of the crime). The
authorities seemed eager to make Davis a shining example
of law and order—setting aside the fact that Punjab Governor
Salmaan Taseer had been murdered by one of his own
bodyguards only a few weeks earlier—and promptly filed a
police report in the case. It was as if Pakistan could not get
over the good luck of having caught a real, live American
spy, and red-handed at that.
While Davis has flown the coop, the rumour mill continues
to churn out more theories. The right wing alleges
the families were pressured into accepting the deal, and all
sides have been shocked by the size of the payment—100
million Pakistani rupees ($1.17 million or  52.7 million) for
each family, a sum that, even divided among the numerous
recipients, would see them comfortably settled for the rest
of their lives.
The case made everyone in Pakistan a self-declared expert
on the Vienna conventions regarding diplomatic immunity. After Davis’ arrest, the US embassy announced that he was a
diplomat and enjoyed indemnity from any legal proceedings
in the case. By then, of course, it was too late. Davis had already
been arrested, and court proceedings had begun. Protests
organised by religious parties were held all over the
country. Banners on the streets of Karachi called for Pakistan
to end its role as “American slaves”. Hysteria over the
issue was whipped up in the media, as right-wing columnists
demanded that Pakistan’s sovereignty be protected and Davis
be dealt with according to the law, Vienna conventions
be damned. Shumaila Kanwal, the widow of Faheem, one of
the men killed by Davis, committed suicide. She demanded
justice as she lay on her deathbed, while multiple television
crews filmed her last wishes.
As rumours reached fever pitch, fears that the case would
be drawn out were laid to rest a week before the eventual
settlement. There was a visible thaw in the chilly relations
between the powerful ISI and the CIA, made clear in leaks
from meetings between both sides. One senior security official, talking about a week before the deal was completed,
sounded rather relaxed. “They need us,” he concluded with
evident satisfaction.
Therein lies the crux of the problem. The United States depends
on Pakistan as a supply route for its forces in Afghanistan,
for cooperation in controlling the flow of militants and
their arms across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and for
the negotiation of a possible political settlement to facilitate
the withdrawal of American troops. The barely concealed
pride in the voice of the security official is one more testament
to the fact that Pakistan knows the United States is
stuck, if you’ll pardon the phrase, in a bad romance.
On the day that he was formally indicted on charges of
murder by the court, Davis and his friends struck a deal:
pay blood money (diyat) to the relatives of those who were
killed. The move was ingenious: use religion to solve the
case, thereby neutralising the loudest voices calling for Davis’
trial and sentencing. For the braying voices of the right-wing
commentariat, the deal to release Davis has come as
a double blow: the hated American Rambo had been freed,
and it was the ISI itself that brokered the deal.
While Davis will certainly be ecstatic at his newfound
freedom, the true winners are, once again, the ISI and its
parent organisation, the Pakistan Army. During the negotiations
with the US, the ISI reportedly demanded that
the CIA reveal the full extent of its operations within the country. Given that relations between the two spy agencies
are shrouded in secrecy, we may never know the complete
terms of the deal reached by the wary allies. But the ISI successfully
demonstrated, at the very least, how easily anti-American sentiment inside Pakistan can be whipped into a
frenzy—all it takes are a few well-placed phone calls, a supply
of US flags and a few groups ready to enact mock executions
on the streets.
The Davis deal also signals an end to the charade that the
civilian government calls the shots in Pakistan. On 17 March,
multiple drone strikes in the tribal areas by CIA-operated
Predator drones left nearly 40 people dead. And instead
of the foreign office or the prime minister, it was Pakistan
Army Chief of Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani who was
the first to issue a statement, dubbing the attack senseless.
The army “has already launched a protest in the strongest
possible terms. It has been highlighted clearly that such aggression
against people of Pakistan is unjustified and intolerable
under any circumstances,” he said. A similar statement
from Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani was issued
hours later.
As the families of the victims in the Davis affair count
their newfound millions, and the right wing pouts with disbelief,
one thing is clear: relations between Pakistan and the
US remain extremely fragile. All it takes to derail the entire
partnership, it seems, are a few well-aimed bullets.
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