In Light of the Secrecy Surrounding India’s Nuclear Programme, the Decision to Build 12 More Reactors is Cause for Concern
Prime Minister Narendra Modi participated in a two-day long World Nuclear Summit in Washington on 1 April to promote and assess nuclear safety. Two days earlier, On 30 March, the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, an Ohio-based think-tank, brought out a research paper, which stated that India’s plan to import 12 nuclear reactors from American equipment suppliers, was “fraught with financial and operational hazard.”
While perhaps not deliberate, the contrast was clear: as India discussed the dangers of a nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands at the summit, the report focused on the futility of India’s keenness to pursue civilian nuclear programmes.
The report, titled “Bad Choice: The Risks, Costs and Viability of Proposed U.S. Nuclear Reactors in India,” maintained that the power generated from these nuclear power plants, would be far more expensive than energy obtained from renewable solar resources. Authored by David Schissel, the institute’s director of resource planning analysis, the report posits concerns regarding the sustainability and utility of nuclear energy as it analyses India’s plan to build twelve nuclear reactors—six each at Mithi Virdi in Gujarat and Kovadda in Karnataka. The US-based nuclear power company Toshiba-Westinghouse is carrying out the first project, and the second one has been contracted to the nuclear services provider General Electric-Hitachi.
If built, the reactors will cost between Rs 6.3 lakh crore and Rs 11 lakh crore. Tariffs for the Kovvada project are estimated to range from Rs 15.85 to Rs 26.04 per kilowatt-hour. The corresponding numbers for the Mithi Virdi reactor are between Rs 9.05 and Rs 17.75 per kWh. The report contrasts this with the prices of solar electricity, which are expected to be around Rs 3 per kWh in 2032.
The report also goes on to stress that, along with the high capital costs of building the new power plants, there is the added concern of the reactor’s untested design. The report added that coupled with the cost, land acquisition, nuclear accident liability, this would ensure that cost and schedule overruns are “a near certainty.”
The report confirmed that India’s keenness to pursue a nuclear programme makes little sense. This is especially true in light of the secrecy and opacity associated with our nuclear programme. The Indian public is often left in the dark as to how much power is actually generated by a nuclear power unit, the output cost of each kilowatt of power being generated, and even where exactly the electricity generated from that particular plant is supplied.
Take, for instance, the recent shut down of the Kakrapar nuclear plant in the Tapi district in Gujarat. At about 9 am on 11 March, a coolant system in one of the nuclear reactors at Kakrapar Atomic Power Plant ruptured. It was not until the next day that the Nuclear Power Corporation of Indian Limited (NPCIL) released a statement confirming the shutdown of the plant and assuring the public that “the reactor was shut down as intended as per design provisions.” “All safety systems are working as intended,” the statement said.
It took hours for the NPCIL to let the world know about the accident at the site. The NPCIL’s site director Lalit Kumar Jain stressed that the radiation levels inside and outside the plant were normal, and an investigation was underway to determine the type and cause of the rupture.
“Eighteen tons of heavy water leaked from the Kakrapar unit due to damage. Where will the water be disposed of?” Krishnakant Chauhan asked me over the phone on 31 March. Chauhan is an activist with the Paryavaran Suraksha Samiti, a non-governmental organization that has been opposing the proposed Mithi Virdi nuclear plant in Gujarat. Chauhan was also upset that despite the NPCIL statement regarding radiation, there was not enough detail made public. “We still have no idea about the level of radiation in the air following the accident.At best, we know from officials that there was no radiation,” Chauhan said, before adding, “but should not they post radiation level out on the website for public to feel reassured that no major accident happened?”
Chauhan went on to state that the dearth of information was due to the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 that controlled how much information about the nuclear programme was made available to the public. The act “responsible for the lack of transparency in nuclear plants in India,” Chauhan said.
The lack of transparency and to the secretive functioning of such plants, put together with the absence of an independent body to monitor India's nuclear plants add to the unease surrounding the decision to build more plants.
The Centre's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), which administers programmes related to nuclear energy, reports directly to the Prime Minister’s Office, and enjoys impunity under the Atomic Energy Act. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which was formed to regulate the safety and security of the country’s civilian nuclear facilities, is not an autonomous body either, functioning as it does under the DAE.
The Kakrapar nuclear plant has had several accidents since being commissioned in 1993, including a major one in 1994 when the reactor was flooded and water reached inside the reactor building, in 2004 and there was another leak in 2011 for similar reasons. In 1996, Manoj Mishra, a lab technician was terminated from service at the plant for turning whistleblower and revealing the damage done to the plant in 1994. A victim of the secrecy and lack of transparency prevailing in India’s nuclear establishment, even the Supreme Court bought the Nuclear Power Corporation’s argument that he could not be declared a whistleblower and accorded any of its protections under the act since he did not have technical degrees and was not an expert in the field.
“The 11 March accident at Kakrapar has buttressed my claims. The authorities were quick to reveal to the press that there was an accident, but they were still late and a lot remains to be known,” Mishra told me on 29 March.
The plant authorities did not disclose the situation for two days, “This was a clear violation of the guidelines mentioned in the Manual on Emergency Preparedness, Vol 1Action plan for site emergency,” said Mishra. He had informed the media to “alert the people and avoid any sort of causality” but it resulted in his termination.
News of the flood inside Kakrapar was published in a local newspaper the very next day, which is how the local administration learnt of it, a whole five days after the incident. “YSR Prasad, then CMD”—chief managing director—“of the plant promised to take lenient view in the final report of my suspension, on the condition of my agreeing with the charges.” Mishra told me, but once he agreed, he was fired for “unauthorised disclosure to media” and “violation of secrecy.”
On 11 March, I reached out to AK Jain, Additional Chief Engineer (Corporate Communications) of the NPCIL through email and telephone. I asked of the government's reponse to the report, and about the shutdown at Kakrapar. As of now, there has been no reply. In light of Mishra's fate, and the shroud of secrecy around the government's response to Schissel's report, one can't help but be concerned regarding the decision to continue with the country's nuclear programme.
Correction: An earlier version of this story stated Kovvada was in Karnataka.